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Abstract
A simple, effective approach is presented for
measuring the susceptibility of power systems to
cascading blackouts. A failure network and an
analysis method are proposed, based on line outage
distribution factors and network theory. This network
is analyzed with metrics that quantify stress. The
metrics can be computed rapidly and be used in realtime operations as well as for. The studies presented
are remarkable for use of real, large-scale data for
the entire Western Interconnection of North America.
The metrics vary reasonably with different seasonal
and loading conditions. Metrics for a pre-blackout
reconstruction show that the system was highly
stressed and correctly identified the most vulnerable
and critical areas and branches. Lowering stress is a
serious candidate for reducing risk of cascading.

1. Introduction
Cascading blackouts are the oldest major unsolved
technical problem in power system engineering, since
before a famous 1965 event. Two generations of
engineers have struggled with this puzzling and
vexing problem. Undamaged systems fail, but not
from external causes. Cause-and-effect cascades
affect large areas and are difficult to recover from.
The power system is a force-at-a-distance, humanmachine energy conversion system of three elements:
(1) hardware to generate and transmit current, (2)
control and protection equipment, and (3) practices
and procedures.
The second and third elements are too complex to
be error-proof. They must be designed and operated
with care, but perfect performance is not practical.
This paper considers the problem of cascading,
where one failure causes others in a chain, in an
essentially undamaged bulk power system. History
reveals that cascading blackouts occur when failures
arise in the second or third elements in the above list,
when large systems are stressed.
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Simple, effective metrics based on network and
power system theory measure stress, the
susceptibility of a system to cascading failures. A
new network, based on known engineering
principles, models how failures flow through a
system. In contrast, traditional networks model how
power flows through a system. We show that
modelling or simulating all of the phenomena of
cascading blackouts is not required.
The stress metrics are computed for very large
(WI, the Western Interconnection of North America)
and large (SW WI, southwestern WI) systems in
different conditions. The results match ad hoc stress
reasonability judgments. Metrics for a pre-blackout
state show that the overall stress was very high,
particularly in cascading areas.

2. Background
A cascading blackout is an uncontrolled,
unexpected chain of cause-and-effect failures in
hardware for generating and carrying current. It
interrupts bulk power service over a large area.
Cascading blackouts are of concern because it can
take hours or days to restore the system. Meanwhile,
many functions of society are disrupted, sometimes
with economic losses of billions of US dollars.

2.1. Typical cascading blackouts
The 9 November 1965 Northeast blackout
occurred with relatively heavy flows on five
essentially-parallel 230-kV lines from the Niagara
Falls area to Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Unbeknownst
to the operators, backup relays were set far below the
lines’ true ratings, procedural failures. A relay tripped
one line. Flows on the others increased. They tripped,
one by one, separating most of the Ontario system
from New York. Ontario had too much load and New
York and nearby systems had too much generation.
Neither could absorb the sudden imbalances. Both
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broke up into islands and blacked out [1].
The 14 August 2003 blackout cost the US from
US$4 billion to US$10 billion. Canada’s GDP was
reduced. Procedural and computer failures in two
control centers led to it. Three 345-kV lines failed
between 15:05 and 15:46 EDT. Not overloaded, they
sagged into trees that were taller than they should
have been. The post-mortem concluded that at “15:05
EDT ... the system was electrically secure [2].” This
apparently was based on n-1 analyses with key line
ratings that were much too high, a procedural failure.
Expecting perfection in practices and procedures is
neither useful nor an acceptable excuse. The system
has to survive inevitable errors.
In 41 minutes, at 15:46, “the blackout might have
been averted [but] it may already have been too late
[2].” The final straw, tripping a fourth 345-kV line at
16:06, was due to a relay interpreting high current
and low voltage as a short circuit.
At 3:00 a.m. on Sunday 28 September 2003 (offpeak time, day, and month), Italy was importing 300
MW more than its scheduled imports from France,
mainly via Switzerland, charging its pumped hydro
plants. A 380-kV Swiss line heated, sagged into a
tree, flashed, and stayed open. The Swiss asked the
Italians to reduce imports by 300 MW to meet the
schedule, which assumed all lines were in service.
They could have asked, but did not ask the Italians to
stop pumping. Another line tripped at 3:25 a.m. In
seconds all lines into Italy tripped, and in three
minutes all mainland Italy was blacked out [3] [4].

2.2. Cascading blackouts that did not occur
On 11 April 1965, 37 “Palm Sunday” tornados in
and near Ohio took 27 American Electric Power Co.
transmission lines and two extra-high voltage (EHV)
substations out of service. Customers on failed radial
lines lost power, but no cascading was reported [5]. It
was Sunday in an off-peak month. The system was
lightly loaded—unstressed by any definition. (It was
not designed to survive 29 contingencies.)
Other large-system, non-blackout events have
been discovered. Smaller systems seem not to
cascade [6], e.g., the Texas system advised one
author that it has been in extremis several times
without cascading [7] [8].

2.3. Other large-scale blackouts: resilience
Puerto Rico was blacked out due to hurricanes
Irma (service lost by two-thirds of electric customers)

and Maria (the electrical infrastructure totally
destroyed) in September 2017. In the January 1998
Quebec - New York ice storm, every overhead line
(transmission and distribution) in a large area was on
the ground. There was a blackout, but no cascading.
Significant work is being done on a problem
complementary to ours, blackouts due to major
disasters, in part developing the notion of resilience
[9] [10]. There are three key differences between
such events and the cascading failures of this paper.
(1) These major disasters do not always result in
cascading. The 1965 Palm Sunday tornadoes and the
1998 ice storm [11] caused great destruction but no
cascading. (2) They cause extensive physical damage
to the system, especially to the distribution system,
which can take weeks or months to repair. Cascading
failures mostly involve the bulk system, with little or
no physical damage. (3) Causes of non-cascading
blackouts include disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes
[9] [10], cyber-attacks [12]), while cascading events
are due to internal failures. The two problems have
different causes, effects, and solutions.
For both of these problems, traditional reliability
does not go far enough. They also have in common
the definition and application of metrics. These
metrics evaluate resilience (to extreme external
events) or stress (for cascading). The two sets of
metrics and their application are very different [9].

2.4. Cascading failures: previous work
The U.S.-Canadian power industry created NERC
(now the North American Electric Reliability Corp.)
after the 1965 blackout to improve reliability. Its
planning and operating criteria have evolved in detail
while being stable in basic concepts. NERC “n-1”
and other standards generally assume that control and
protective devices, and policies and procedures, will
work properly, with limited exceptions. Preventing
cascading always has been central [13].
State estimation was introduced to provide
accurate inputs to real-time procedures for increasing
reliability [14].
A NERC study found that 73.5 percent of
significant events were aggravated by “hidden
failures” of the protection system, part of the second
power system element above [15], [16].
Years ago it was observed that “Power systems
have grown enormously and have become
interconnected over vast regions. And we have had
two severe blackouts and are undoubtedly headed for
more.” Also, “The more complex a society, the more
chance there is that it will get fouled up [17].”
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About one-sixth of an excellent 1978 paper on the
future power system was on blackouts. It concluded,
“[Cascading] blackouts will not exist in the year 2000
... There is a good chance that by the year 2000 the
term [cascading blackout] will be considered to be a
term out of the Dark Ages (sic) [18].”
Much labor has been invested on the cascading
problem [19]. But misconceptions can lead to
questionable conclusions.
For example, “Since
power systems are generally operated to be N-1
secure, most historical cascades have been triggered
by multiple [independent] outages in combination,
motivating the need for probabilistic analysis [19].”
Multiple independent outages have caused few, if
any, cascades, so this conclusion is unsupported. In
all cascading blackouts known to the authors, system
operation clearly was not NERC compliant (though
operators might have thought that it was): a single
outage caused cascading, a criteria violation.

2.5. N-1 criteria are not sufficient
The post-mortem report of the 14 August 2003
US/Canada
blackout
concluded,
“Although
FirstEnergy’s system was technically [i.e., by n-1
standards] in secure electrical condition before 15:05
EDT, it was still highly vulnerable [2].” (Italics
added by authors)
This is authoritative recognition that current
standards are not sufficient for preventing cascading.
A recent paper called the 1965 Northeast blackout
an n-5 event, and systems cannot be designed to
withstand these. The implication: occasional
blackouts are inevitable [1]. With respect, the authors
believe that the 1965 outage was not an n-5 event.
The tripping of the first line (n-1) caused the other
four to trip in sequence (n-1-1-etc.). The distinction is
important. Such events are not inevitable.

3. A cascading outage network
3.1. Power flow network
Fig. 1 is the basic model of a network. The oneline (positive sequence) network is the basis for most
power system modeling of the bulk transmission
network. This model uses the Ybus (bus admittance)
matrix. (Bold type indicates vectors and matrices.)

The Ybus network has the following properties:
• Ybus is square and symmetric.
• Each row and column is for a bus (vertex).
• Each edge is a branch (line or transformer).
The off-diagonal terms are branch admittances
between two buses. Most are zero, since each bus is
connected to few others. So Ybus is very sparse. The
laws of Ohm and Kirchhoff determine how demand
and generation affect bus voltages and branch flows.

3.2. Cascading failure network
The cascading outage problem needs a different
model since the objective is to find how the outage of
one branch affects the flows on other branches. In the
cascading network, the vertices are branches (lines,
transformers, interfaces), not buses. Each branch is
linked to every other branch, not by single lines, but
by the network as a whole. Edges in a cascading
network are modeled by Line Outage Distribution
Factors (LODF) or simply Distribution Factors
(DFAX), defined by:
𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘𝑗 = 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘0 + (𝐷𝐹𝐴𝑋𝑘𝑗 × 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗0 ).

(1)

In (1), 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘0 and 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘𝑗 are the pre- and postoutage flows in monitored branch (k), and 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗0 is
the pre-outage flow in outaged branch (j). The postoutage flow in branch (j) is zero, and -1 < DFAXkj <
+1.
• DFAX, containing the elements DFAXk,j,
with mo rows and mm columns, is much larger
than YBUS. The subscripts “o” and “m” refer
to “outaged” and “monitored”.
• Each row is for an n-1 outage branch.
• Each column is for a branch whose flow is
monitored (computed) for each n-1outage.
Commercial power-flow programs compute the
elements of DFAX from Ybus using the laws of
Ohm and Kirchhoff. Branch limits are based on such
effects as tree heights in rights-of-way. Two
electrically identical lines in different rights-of-way
may experience the same n-1 flow after a
contingency. One may overload but the other not, due
to different limits. Therefore, failure propagation
through the DFAX network is complicated in a
different way than is power flow.

3.3. Typical DFAX matrices
Fig. 1. Network
nomenclature [20]

Fig. 2 shows the distributions of the absolute
values of millions of DFAX for southwestern WI
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(SW WI) for three years: 2016 and 2012 (summer
high demand), and 8 Sept. 2011 Pre-blackout. Other
systems have similar curves [6]. Plotted on log-log
scale, each density function (not shown) is close to a
straight line, a power law, common in large networks.
In Fig. 2, each point x,y on a curve is the number
‘y’ of DFAX whose absolute value is greater than or
equal to the number ‘x’. (Neither this figure, nor this
paper, expresses or deals with probabilities.)
Even in a five-year interval with relatively low
demand growth, the system evolved to have 30%
more higher-value DFAX (> 0.7). It became more
tightly coupled and more susceptible to cascading.
10,000,000
2016 Summer high demand
2012 Summer high demand
2011 Sept. 8 Pre-blackout

Number of DFAX

1,000,000

100,000
4,533 DFAX ≥ 0.7
(2016 Summer high)

10,000
3,493 DFAX ≥ 0.7
(2011 Sept. 8)
1,000
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

Absolute value of DFAX

Fig. 2. DFAX distributions for SW WI.

4. Stress metrics
4.1. Previous applications of network theory
Euler’s 1736 solution of the Konigsberg bridge
problem is considered the beginning of network or
graph theory, but most of its development has
occurred in the past 100 years.
For our purposes, network theory responds to three
observations.
• Large networks are pervasive.
• They are too big to study element by element.
• “Big is different.” “Large” (not precisely
defined) networks behave differently than
small networks.
“The problem with systems like the power grid is
that they are built of many components whose
individual behavior is ... well understood ... but
whose collective behavior ... can be sometimes
orderly and sometimes chaotic, confusing, and even
destructive [21].”
Therefore, concludes network theory, for large
networks one must study structural properties and

1

metrics. References [21] and [20] survey network
theory and give many examples.
Network theory has been applied to a variety of
problems in power, including attempting to determine
contributions of each generator to each load [22] and
generating random networks for studying widespread
failures [23].
Network theory applications to cascading
blackouts always use models where buses are vertices
and lines are edges [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]. They
consider a random failure at one bus propagating to a
neighboring bus. They usually are based on abstract
networks rather than real power systems. They do not
seem to use Ohm’s and Kirchhoff’s laws to model the
mechanisms for failure propagation.
A number of researchers have done work that
resonates strongly with the approach of this paper.
Three notable papers are mentioned here. The first
[15] argues persuasively that the cascading problem
is neither well formulated nor well addressed. The
“present practice in system planning and on-line
security analysis neglects the impact of the protection
system.” Furthermore, relying on n-1 criteria is
inadequate, and the “probability of cascading failures
is much higher than the probability of random (i.e.
independent) tripping of k out of N components of
the system.”
A second study [16] identifies and simulates
problems which affect cascading: network loading,
spinning reserve, controls, and “hidden failures”
(limited to the protection system). Hidden failures are
not manifested until the system is stressed. Failure
dynamics
are
modelled
probabilistically.
Probabilities increase from Pr = 0 below a threshold
loading (for instance, 100 percent of rating) to Pr = 1
above a second threshold (say, 140 percent of rating).
An EPRI project [29] analyzed n-k conditions on a
3-area part of the 50,000-bus and 65,000-branch
Eastern Interconnection of North America. Analyzing
all n-k conditions was impossible. A few (>31,000)
independent n-2 outage combinations were created
and tested from a user-supplied list of perhaps 250
single contingencies. Most n-2 events ended
uneventfully after overloaded elements tripped. Some
38 led to voltage collapse or islanding, but none took
more than three steps to do so. Particularly intriguing
are the small number of n-2 outages that resulted in
overloads, and the huge fraction of these overloads
that did not lead to further cascading.
Next we introduce two key concepts as bases of
this paper: when the system is stressed, it is more
susceptible to cascading from one of many
improbable failures, most of which lack models or
data. Therefore, our focus is on modeling and
measuring stress to measure risk of cascading.
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4.2 Vulnerability metrics

𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑗 = ∑ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑉𝑘,𝑗 .
Vulnerability is assessed from the n-1 flow in a
branch after the outage of other branches in the
system. This is a reasonable measure of stress, as
cascading always begins with one outage causing one
or more branches to become highly loaded and fail.
Vulnerability rank is the maximum absolute value
of n-1 flow through a branch. RankV is an mm x 1
column vector. RankVk is the maximum post-outage
flow on monitored branch (k) for the outage of all mj
outage branches, taken one at a time. RankVk may be
greater than, less than, or equal to the precontingency flow on branch (k). See (1) and (2).
|𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑗 |
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑉𝑘 = max (
) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 (𝑗)
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘

(2)

Vulnerability degree is the number of outages for
which a monitored vertex will be heavily loaded.
This definition differs slightly from the common
usage of degree. In our examples “heavily loaded”
means a threshold of 75 percent or 100 percent of
rating. Specific thresholds will be discussed later.
DegreeV is an mm x 1 vector. DegreeVk is the
number of outages for which the absolute value of the
n-1 power flow on vertex (k) equals or exceeds its
threshold. See (3), (4).
𝑚𝑜

𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑘 = ∑ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑉𝑘,𝑗 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒

(3)

𝑗=1

𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑉𝑘,𝑗 = 0 if (

|𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑗 |
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘

< 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗 ),

(4)

else = 1.

4.3. Criticality metrics
The criticality of a vertex assesses the seriousness
of post-outage (n-1) flows in the system following its
outage.
Criticality rank, RankC, is a 1 x mo row vector.
RankCj is the maximum n-1 flow, as a fraction of
monitored branch rating, over all monitored vertices
after the outage of vertex (j) (5).
|𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑗 |
),
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 (𝑘).

𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑗 = max (

(5)

Criticality degree, DegreeC, is a 1 x mo row
vector. DegreeCj is the number of monitored vertices
(k) whose flows will equal or exceed their thresholds
after the outage of vertex (j) (6), (4).

(6)

𝑘=1

4.4. Clarifications and illustration
A mnemonic may be helpful: a vulnerable branch
is a victim. A critical branch is a culprit. These
definitions are for single branches. For a system, the
metrics are distributions (which are not probabilities).
Equations (5) and (6) are very much like (2) and
(3). They differ in the subscripts. See Table I, which
is useful for understanding this paper. Vulnerability
analyses are done by rows, criticality by columns.
The n-1 flows for three monitored vertices
(branches), the heart of the table, are show in yellow,
for two outaged vertices that are part of a larger
system. Branch 2 is a path or interface of
series/parallel branches, monitored but not outaged.
Vulnerability Computation (RankV, DegreeV, tan
area): RankV2 = max n-1 flow on branch2 = |-1.39|
of the rating of branch2. The max is for the outage of
branch1. DegreeV2 = 2 because the outage of either
of two vertices (1 or 3) would cause |flow2| to exceed
the chosen threshold of 75% of the rating of branch2.
TABLE I
Vulnerability and criticality metrics illustrated
Criticality (outaged vertices "j")
RankC
2.43
0.87
DegreeC*
2
1
RankV
DegreeV*
vertex
1
3
0.49
0
1
0
0.49
1.39
2
2
-1.39
0.87
2.43
1
3
-2.43
0
n-1 flows (fractions
Vulnerability
of monitored
(monitored vertices "k")
vertex ratings)
* Thresholds = 75% of monitored vertex ratings

Criticality computation (RankC, DegreeC, blue
area): RankC1 = maximum n-1 flow of any branch
for the outage of vertex1 = |-2.43|. DegreeC1 = 2 as
two monitored vertices have |n-1 flow| > 0.75 for the
outage of vertex1.
Interpreting Table I: RankC and DegreeC agree vertex1 is more critical than vertex3. RankV and
DegreeV agree - Vertex1 is the least vulnerable.

5. Diagnosing stress using metrics
The system analyzed below evolves constantly as
facilities are added and upgraded. Operating states
change from constantly. Results from past data may
not reflect the state of the system at any other time.
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5.1. Western Interconnection study
Analyses of stress for the eastern US and Peru
have been presented [30] [6] [31]. Here, we report indepth studies of North America’s Western
Interconnection (WI) expanding on the preliminary
results of [32].
The study of the WI used high quality power flow
base cases (see Table II). All were built by WI
utilities and WECC and are realistic and consistent.
Base case access is limited. Data and results are
tightly controlled under CEII (Critical Energy
Industry Infrastructure) or similar rules. It is unheard
of to give researchers access to pre-blackout cases.

of them. For example, a lower-voltage branch may be
ignored, based on the assumption that events in the
lower voltage system will not cause cascading.

TABLE II
Western Interconnection cases studied
(Statistics below are for the Southwestern region only)
Power Flow Case
(Season, Demand)
2016 Summer High (HS)
2016 Spring High (HSP)
2016 Winter High (HW)
2016 Winter Low (LW)
2016 Summer Low (LS)
2012 Summer High
8 Sept. 2011 Pre-blackout

Demand /
Generation
(MW)
62,691 / 57,578
44,229 / 40,472
38,931 / 36,085
27,530 / 30,500
34,577 / 32,010
61,933 / 57,841
51,619 / 46,752

Monitored
Vertices

Fig. 3. RankV distributions for SW WI, 2016 base cases.

2,419
2,456
2,474
2,462
2,401
2,215
2,088

Modelling and data problems are the bane of the
transition from theory to practice. Happily, here there
were few such issues in mostly-excellent data, so
valid conclusions can be drawn.
Two other explanations for the high RankVs for
HSP and HS are more troubling. First, the operators
may be counted on to respond in real-time to some
contingencies in high-stress conditions. But failures
in practices and procedures, including operator
actions, are common triggers for cascading. The 8
Sept. 2011 blackout involved precisely such failures.
Second, these high RankV situations may become the
next unforeseen blackout.
Fig. 3 and similar distributions for the other three
metrics are dramatic but difficult to work with. Table
III, from vertical cuts through the distributions, is
easier to handle.
For the SW WI system, RankV is the number of
branches with vulnerability rank > 1, that is, with n-1
flows > 100% of the branch rating. This amounts to
259 branches for HS - 10.7% of the branches in the
system, which is a lot. For HS, 108 branches will
have n-1 flows > rating for at least two separate
contingencies (DegreeV > 2).
Criticality is a less familiar concept. In HS, for
each of 309 single contingencies, at least 1 monitored
branch will have n-1 flows > threshold (100% of
rating in this table). DegreeC > 2 means that for each
of 89 single contingencies (in HS), n-1 flows on two
or more monitored lines will exceed threshold.
Table III also includes an ad hoc judgment on how
much the system is at risk to cascading. Demand and

Most analyses below consider only vertices (lines,
transformers) in SW WI, but the DFAX reflected the
entire WI. Normal system changes caused minor
variations in the number of branches.

5.2. Stress metrics and operating states
Stress metrics for individual branches are scalars.
Stress metrics for systems are distributions of branch
metrics. As mentioned earlier, distributions should
not be confused with probabilities. Fig. 3 shows
system vulnerability metrics for several cases. Most
vertices have RankV < 1.0, consistent with the n-1
criteria.
Up to 295 vertices (12 percent of the 2,400+
vertices) have RankV equal to or greater than the
branch ratings, mainly in high-stress seasons, High
Demand Summer and Spring. For three seasons, up
to 20 vertices have n-1 flows more than twice their
ratings. These may be NERC n-1 violations.
One might ask how a base case can violate the n-1
criteria. The base cases are hypothetical, made for WI
operations planning studies. They are used to identify
possible problems and do not include “fixes” for all
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imports/exports (Table II) are considered to be first
order stressors, and common practice to avoid
maintenance in peak seasons is considered to be a
second order stressor.
Area
For the 2016 data, with two minor exceptions the
four metrics are consistent with this ad hoc stress
Arizona
judgment. (The 2011 data will be discussed later.)
Imperial IID
Most values of the metrics differ in the first
LADWP
significant figure. The differentiation is quite clear.Mexico-CFE
TABLE III
SW WI stress metrics and ad hoc risk judgment

Season/Demand
Summer 2016
High - HS
Low - LS
Winter 2016
High - HW
Low - LW
Spring 2016
High - HSP
8 September 2011

108 4.5%
4 0.2%

51
26

2.1%
1.1%

6 0.2%
4 0.2%

109

4.4%

128

6.1%

309 12.8%
41 1.7%

89 3.7%
1 0.0%

Highest
Low

49
24

2.0%
1.0%

5 0.2%
2 0.1%

Medium
Lowest

34 1.4%

96

3.9%

14 0.6%

High

46 2.2%

161

7.7%

32 1.5% Pre-blackout

Branches

Nevada
San Diego
SoCal SCE

1,542
134
272
255
506
397
1,057

SW WI

4,096

Vulnerability
Criticality
RankV > 1
RankC > 1
Ad hoc risk monitored
DegreeV > 2
DegreeC > 2
Notes:
(DegreeV > 1)
(DegreeC > 1)
judgment
vertices
259 10.7%
38 1.6%

TABLE IV
Pre-cascading metrics, seven SW WI areas and total,
8 September 2011

2,419
2,401

Vulnerability
RANKV > 1
DEGREEV > 2
(DegreeV > 1)
39
2.5%
25
1.6%

10

7.5%

6

4.5%

0
4
6
6
62

0.0%
1.6%
1.2%
1.5%
5.9%

0
2
2
1
28

0.0%
0.8%
0.4%
0.3%
2.6%

126

3.1%

63

1.5%

Criticality
RANKC > 1
DEGREEC > 2
(DegreeC > 1)
73
4.7%
7
0.5%
7
5.2%
1
0.7%
1
0.4%
1
0.4%
4
1.6%
0
0.0%
14
2.8%
0
0.0%
11
2.8%
4
1.0%
75
7.1%
15
1.4%

183

4.5%

27

0.7%

Notes:
Herelines
“branches”
include non-outaged radial lines and transformers.
Branches
include
and transformers.
A few
aremore
counted
more
than one area.
Some branches
are branches
included in
thaninone
area.
SW 2011Sept08 w/o PST

5/22/2017: 13:1

5.4. Inflections and Thresholds

Abid - please change > to > in printing headings and in software calculations.
2,474
Also change dates to mm/dd/yyyy
2,462
2,456
2,088

Thresholds = 100% of ratings for Degree metrics.

Planners and operators could identify the high
vulnerability branches and look for ways to reduce it,
as higher stress means higher risk of cascading. They
might focus more on the highly critical branches:
some outages could cause high n-1 loadings; a few of
these may affect many branches. Or they could seek
ways to make their system inherently less stressed.

5.3. Pre-blackout metrics, 8 September 2011
On 8 September 2011, a switching error tripped
the 500kV Hassayampa - North Gila line. The line
had tripped before without cascading, but on this day
all the SW WI metrics showed high stress (Table III).
The 500kV outage caused the two Coachella
230kV/92kV transformers to overload and trip.
Further cascading blacked out much of SW WI [33].
Metrics show where stress was highest: 7.5% of
Imperial Irrigation District branches (Table IV, row
2) had RankV > 1, well above the SW WI average.
Six, including the Coachella transformers, were
vulnerable for two or more n-1 outages.
Cascading began in Arizona (row 1), with over
one-third of the critical SW WI branches, including
the initiating outage.
An area being stressed does not mean that
cascading will occur or start there. But history is
clear: cascading occurs when a system is stressed.
Had the operators known, they could have reduced
the stress. A switching error need not have cascaded.

Change in demand can affect stress. Dealing with
this effect takes in-depth knowledge of a system.
WECC’s 2016 cases embody careful, consistent
modeling. In Fig. 4, stress goes up linearly with
demand. At about 35,000 MW, the slope changes.
Another interpretation: at 62,700 MW of demand,
about 600 branches are loaded to or above 75 percent
of their ratings for n-1 contingencies. Of these
branches, 260 reach or exceed 100 percent of ratings,
and 100 reach or exceed 125 percent of ratings. The
system is highly stressed at this level of demand.
The pattern is the same for all thresholds. The
value of the threshold affects the slope, but changes
only a little the location of the inflection. Tipping
points have been noted before [6] [34] [35].

Fig. 4. Vulnerability rank as a function of demand, SW WI.

Setting thresholds too high or too low may give
odd results. Choosing a reasonable threshold is like
focusing a microscope, and is not difficult.
No claim is made that a branch will fail once flow
reaches the threshold. Choosing thresholds for
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DegreeV and DegreeC is for making vertical cuts
through the distributions, to create Tables III – V.
The results are easier to work with than Fig 3.

5.5. Very large system studies

Area

For Table V, essentially all WI branches wereAlberta
Arizona
outaged and monitored. Key areas (rows) areBC Hydro
highlighted. In one, for 8% of its branches n-1El Paso
loadings met or exceeded the branch limits. This areaFortis BC
and two others were the most vulnerable in the WI.Idaho
They also had the highest fraction of branches thatImperial IID
were overloaded by two or more singleLADWP
contingencies. A fourth high stress area also is noted.Mexico-CFE
Montana
One area had 455 RankC>1 branches. If any ofNevada
these branches had an outage, other branches wouldNew Mexico
overload. For 339 very critical branches, two or moreNorthwest
other branches would overload. One-third of thePACE
critical branches in the WI, and one- half of thePG and E
highly critical ones, were in this area. Another areaPS Colorado
San Diego
with high DegreeC is also found. An interesting
Sierra
conclusion is that stress-related problems can beSoCal SCE
different in nature for different areas.
WAPA RM
WAPA UM

TABLE V
Western Interconnection metrics, Summer High load, 2016.
(“Branches” include only monitored/outaged branches)
Branches
2,022
1,771
3,042
386
312
502
327
539
263
541
746
793
4,973
1,634
4,471
832
504
608
1,281
1,127
49

Vulnerability
Criticality
RANKV> 1
DEGREEV> 2
RANKC> 1
DEGREEC> 2
(DEGREEV> 1)
(DEGREEC> 1)
53 2.6%
26 1.3%
154 7.6%
48 2.4%
67 3.8%
38 2.1%
105 5.9%
24 1.4%
107 3.5%
61 2.0%
135 4.4%
57 1.9%
13 3.4%
5 1.3%
19 4.9%
3 0.8%
16 5.1%
8 2.6%
20 6.4%
6 1.9%
3 0.6%
0 0.0%
14 2.8%
10 2.0%
8 2.4%
4 1.2%
8 2.4%
2 0.6%
29 5.4%
18 3.3%
29 5.4%
10 1.9%
9 3.4%
8 3.0%
28 10.6%
6 2.3%
3 0.6%
1 0.2%
21 3.9%
9 1.7%
16 2.1%
2 0.3%
17 2.3%
0 0.0%
18 2.3%
5 0.6%
17 2.1%
5 0.6%
122 2.5%
49 1.0%
455 9.1%
339 6.8%
65 4.0%
6 0.4%
72 4.4%
16 1.0%
149 3.3%
71 1.6%
211 4.7%
58 1.3%
21 2.5%
8 1.0%
24 2.9%
4 0.5%
42 8.3%
18 3.6%
72 14.3%
25 5.0%
17 2.8%
2 0.3%
4 0.7%
0 0.0%
102 8.0%
54 4.2%
98 7.7%
45 3.5%
6 0.5%
0 0.0%
2 0.2%
0 0.0%
2 4.1%
1 2.0%
2 4.1%
0 0.0%

6. Adequacy and implications of metrics
All WI

6.1. Adequacy of stress metrics

Notes

Three issues appear to have been overlooked in
this work. First, cascading often includes non-linear
effects like voltage collapse or transient instability.
These usually result from high branch loading. It
usually is not necessary to model these effects
separately in computing the metrics.
In the studies above, the branch and path limits
were determined from conductor thermal ratings, but
reduced as needed for special voltage or transient
stability concerns, etc. For each monitored branch the
metrics measure how close n-1 flows are to these
limits, including these adjustments. The method does
not model all the phenomena associated with
cascading. But there is a benefit to having a simple
practical approximate technique if it can provide an
effective warning signal in a real, large scale system.
Our metrics can.
Linear DFAX analysis is an accepted way of
approximating post-contingency MW flows on all of
the other branches, for each contingency. But if the
DFAX do not give accurate enough n-1 flows, a.c.
contingency analysis, which is not too much slower,
can be used in calculating metrics.
The second issue: cascading is an n-1-k-... event.

26,447

858 3.2%

381 1.4% 1,490 5.6%

658 2.5%

Branches include lines and transformers.
Some Branches are included in more than one area.
Case WI 16HS3ae; Lossless DC; w/o PST

5/19/2017: 20:30

One may ask, “How can the metrics, which come
from n-1 analyses, measure the risk of cascading?”
The first and obvious part of the answer is that a
necessary condition for cascading is that some first
contingency cause a second contingency.
The metrics consider all possible first (n-1)
contingencies. For each of these, the metrics evaluate
the post-contingency flows on every branch. If all the
metrics of vulnerability and criticality are low, the
system is not stressed, and it is unlikely that n-1-1
cascading will occur. On the other hand, the more
high indices there are, the more opportunities for an
n-1-1 event, and for further cascading as well. In
other words, the metrics for each n-1 state are
indicative of the system risk beyond that n-1 event.
High stress is necessary for cascading, we claim. It
is not a sufficient condition. History reveals that the
right failure also must occur in control and protection
devices, or in practices and procedures.
The stress metrics do not attempt to forecast
cascading. They quantify the risk of cascading.
A third issue: Our study did not model remedial
action schemes (RAS). Most power flow programs
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could not do it then, but PowerWorld, which we
used, could. One reviewer noted that WI RAS data
usually is not given to researchers, and a “forgotten”
RAS made the 2011 blackout worse. Modeling that
RAS would not have changed our conclusions.

6.2. Which metric is best?
Each metric measures stress in a different way.
None has been shown to be “best”. Tests have not
shown high correlations among them [32]. It is
reasonable for the stress of a complex system to be
multi-faceted, a vector, not a scalar. Combining the
four metrics into a single metric would destroy
information.
Medicine also uses a vector of four or five stress
metrics, called vital signs. Measuring the metrics is
simple, e.g., a thermometer scan of the forehead. It is
more useful to know that “All vital signs are normal,
except that the pulse is quite high” than that “The
weighted sum of all the vital signs is a bit high.”

6.3. Two implications and a practical issue
As demand and generation grow, transmission
systems are expanded to increase transfer capability.
Previous work showed that this expansion may
increase the risk of cascading [6]. This important
topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
Another important topic – how operators and
planners may appropriately reduce stress – is also
beyond the scope of this paper.
For real networks, the database is huge, but most
DFAXes are very small. In this work, sparsity
methods were used to store and compute only with
DFAX absolute values above 0.001.

7. Summary and conclusions
This paper presents significant advances on the
oldest major unsolved technical problem in power
systems, cascading blackouts.
Four metrics quantify stress, the risk of cascading.
These metrics were computed for the Western
Interconnection of North America (WI) using utility
databases for different seasons and demands.
The same metrics were computed for a
reconstruction of the pre-event state of a major
cascading blackout. The metrics showed that the
system was at high risk. They identified the areas
where cascading developed, and the key branches
involved, as being very vulnerable and critical.

Other interesting new results include:
• In a large system with low load growth, the
number of large DFAX grew 32% in five
years. More branches became tightly coupled.
• Stress varies reasonably and significantly in
time and location, with differing needs for
preventive action.
• Tipping points were observed in this and
earlier studies using the metrics.
• 26,400 easy-to-do contingency analyses gave
useful diagnoses of risk of cascading for all
the WI, without running 350E+06 n-2 cases.
We conclude that the metrics are useful and
practical measures of stress. The input data is a
power flow base case or a real-time or stored state
estimation snapshot. Proper use of these metrics will
identify a system’s susceptibility to cascading, and
will pinpoint the most vulnerable and critical areas
and facilities. The information can be used for
planning, operations, and post-mortems.
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